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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
AREA OF TORTS*
THOMAS E. FAIRCHILD**
The supreme court has recently made some significant changes in
tort law. The court and legislature havie both made changes in procedure
which are of interest to the negligence and personal injury lawyer.
In McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.' and Colson v.
Rule' the doctrine of assumption of risk (at least by implication from
conduct) was abolished in autombile host-guest cases, and in farm
labor cases. In Bielski v. Schulze3 the concept of gross negligence was
abandoned and contribution between joint tort feasors was placed on
a proportionate, pro rata basis, according to the degree of fault at-
tributable to each.
In Kojis v. Doctors Hospital4 the court abolished the doctrine render-
ing charitable hospitals immune from tort liability to paying patients.
In Holytz v. City of Milwaukee6 the doctrine of governmental immunity
was abolished.
By rule the court amended the special verdict statute.7 Now the court
"may submit separate questions as to the negligence of each party, and
whether such negligence was a cause without submitting separately
any particular respect in which the party was allegedly negligent."
In June, 1961, the legislature amended sec. 326.12, Stats. Deposi-
tions may now be taken of any person, for discovery purposes, or
for use as evidence, in any civil action or proceeding. A deponent
may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the controversy. The new statute is taken almost verbatim from
*Prepared for publication from a speech given at the University of Wisconsin,
May 5, 1961, and from a speech given June 9, 1962, before the Wisconsin
League of Municipalities.
*J'Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court. Prepared with the research assistance of
David L. Walther, Member of the Wisconsin Bar, and former associate editor
of the Marquette Law Review.115 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W. 2d 14 (1962).
215 Wis. 2d 387, 113 N.W. 2d 21 (1962).
3 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W. 2d 105 (1962).
4 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W. 2d 131, 107 N.W. 2d 292 (1961).
5 See Duncan v. Steeper, dec. June 29, 1962, for comment with respect to the
limitation to paying patients.
6 Dec. June 5, 1962.
7 11 Wis 2d v. effective June 1, 1961.
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Federal Rule 26.8 This statute has been construed in one decision. In
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Circuit Court,9 the circuit court ordered two
appraisers employed by the state in a condemnation proceeding to testify
on examination before trial at the instance of the owner as to methods
used and factors considered in arriving at their evaluation of the prop-
erty. The supreme court denied a writ of prohibition, holding that the
questions did not ask for privileged matter, that the information was
not protected under the "work product of the lawyer" doctrine of the
federal courts and that experts have no personal right to refuse to
testify as experts in the situation presented in this case. The court stated:
In enacting sec. 326.12, Stats., in its present form, the legisla-
ture has decided to liberalize our discovery procedure. Such de-
cision must be based upon the belief that trials will be more likely
to accomplish justice between the parties, and may at times be
avoided or shortened in the public interest as well, if material
relevant testimony is made available to all parties before trial.
In the light of this purpose we conclude that in the situation
presented here the fact that the deponents are experts does not
make the proposed examinations unauthorized by sec. 326.12.
In a memorandum on motion for rehearing, the court pointed out
that an expert witness might apply to a trial court for compensation in
excess of ordinary witness fees for time spent in giving a deposition,
not to exceed $25 per day.
The proximity with which the language of the Wisconsin statute
parallels the federal rule makes it likely that the federal decisions will
be of aid to the court in interpreting the statute. It also appears that the
court has construed the statute liberally in the spirit of its enactment.
The doctrine of parent-child immunity has been abolished in several
states in recent years. In 1959 we refused to abolish the doctrine in
Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.10
In Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co.11 the court determined
that inter spousal immunity lies within the sphere of family law rather
than tort law, and that the law of the domicile rather than the law of
place of injury should therefore govern the capacity of one spouse to
sue the other in tort. In Haynie v. Hanson2 the court declined to modify
the Haumschild rule.
In Haynie there was a collision in Wisconsin between cars driven by
a resident of Illinois and a resident of Wisconsin. The wife and pas-
senger of the Illinois driver sued the Wisconsin driver and his insurer.
The latter sought contribution from the insurer of the Illinois driver.
The court rejected an argument that public policy required application
S 28 USC.
9 15 Wis. 2d 311, 324, 113 N.W. 2d 537 (1961).
10 6 Wis. 2d 44, 93 N.W. 2d 867 (1959).
117 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W. 2d 814 (1959).
12 16 Wis. 2d 299, 114 N.W. 2d 443 (1962).
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of Wisconsin law, permitting tort liability of husband to wife, in order
to afford the right of contribution to the Wisconsin driver. Such ap-
plication by the forum state of its own substantive law would fulfill
the requirements of the doctrine of choice of law propounded by
Professor Brainerd Currie," although it would not conform with more
generally accepted rules.
If a generalization be appropriate, many of these changes represent
a movement away from absolute defenses to liability and toward broader
determinations by juries of the rights of litigants, in the light of their
respective faults or their departures from standards of reasonableness
as recognized by society.
Occasionally we hear of advocates of legislation creating a system
of compensation for injury caused by automobiles, without regard to
negligence or fault. Perhaps judicial willingness to change old doctrines
which produce injustice when applied to present day situations provides
an answer to such proposals. The impetus for workmen's compensation
statutes resulted in some degree from rigid rules of tort law, which
denied compensation to the injured and which the courts declined to
liberalize.
The court has frequently heard the argument that certain doctrines
could not be changed or developed by the court because of common law
origins. Sec. 13, Art. XIV, of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:
Such parts of the common law as are now in force in the
territory of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this constitution,
shall be and continue part of the law of this state until altered
or suspended by the legislature.
This provision appears in the part of the Constitution denominated
"Schedule."
In State v. Esser 4 and in Bielski v. Schiulze'5 the court held that
this provision does not prevent the court from developing or changing
the common law. The further adaptation and development of common
law principles is part of the judicial power. The court held that to con-
strue sec. 13, Art. XIV, as prohibiting courts from modifying the com-
mon law would be a limitation by a schedule provision of the grant of
judicial power not so limited in the body of the constitution.
Another argument frequently used in opposing a change has been
that the legislature approved a rule announced by the court by failing
to change it. Up to now this argument has been persuasive in the matter
of parent-child immunity 6 and until the Holytz decision was persuasive
in the matter of governmental immunity. The concept of legislative
'1 Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuKE LAW
JOURNAL 171, 178.
1416 Wis. 2d 567, 115 N.W. 2d 505 (1962).
15 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W. 2d 105 (1962).
16 Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mit. Automobile Ins. Co., supra, footnote 10.
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acquiescence by silence has been considered by several writers. Professor
Henry M. Hart, Jr., of Harvard University Law School, in an article
in the Centennial volume of the Columbia Law School,'" argues that
legislative silence should have no effect on the law. He is joined in this
opinion by Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court, writing
a companion article in the same volume. A legislature can create law
only by complying with certain procedures, resulting in the passage of
a bill. Failure to enact a law cannot be the enactment of a law. In the
Esser Case,18 the court quoted Professor Hart as follows:
If we value this process of growth as highly as I have urged
that we ought, then we should always be reluctant to conclude
that the legislature, in relation to any matter, has tried to para-
lyze the process. We should welcome a doctrine which says that
the legislature can do this, if it can do it at all, not by silence but
only by unmistakable words. Only by adherence to such a doc-
trine can the resources of the judicial process for the infusion
of reason into the law be fully utilized.
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee 9 indicates that the court feels free to
change doctrines established by the courts, even where proposals ad-
dressed to the legislature have been defeated. Mr. Justice Currie, in a
concurring opinion in that case, stated:
I concur fully in the foregoing opinion by Mr. justice Gordon.
However, I deem it necessary to explain the rationale behind our
reversal of position on the effect to be accorded legislative action
in defeating bills which would have abrogated a rule of law previ-
ously established by this court. Heretofore, this court has ad-
hered to the view that rejection by the legislature of a bill of
this character constituted a clear expression of legislative intent
that the court made rule was to be retained. Up to now this court
has felt that, under our three department system of government,
comity required that courts yield to any determination of policy
falling within the competence of the legislature, and that the
court's hands were tied to change a court made rule which the
legislature had plainly indicated was to be retained.
However, we deem that the fallacy in the rationale of our
former position is that legislative action defeating a proposed
change of a court made rule is a per se expression of legislative
acquiescence in the rule. If there were any way of determining
with certitude that all votes cast to defeat a bill of this character
were intended as a legislative endorsement on the merits of the
correctness of the court made rule, it would be the duty of this
court to yield to this expression of the legislative will. However,
there is always present the possibility that some undeterminable
number of legislators voted as they did because, inasmuch as the
rule sought to be abrogated had been adopted by this court, they
17 The Courts and Law Making-Comment, LEGAL INSTITUTIONs TODAY AND
Toioiiow, pp. 40-48, Columbia University Law School (1959).
18 Supra, footnote 14.
19 Supra, footnote 6.
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deferred to the supposed wisdom of the court, or else deter-
mined that the court should correct its own mistakes. Because
of this possibility, I have reversed my hitherto held and expressed
views, and have come to the conclusion that this court must face
up to the responsibility of changing a court made rule of law,
which we deem the interests of justice require be changed, even
though the legislature, by positive action short of codification
has refused to make the change. The legislature still has the last
word and may restore the court-abolished rule if it determines
public policy so requires.
-One should not, of course, conclude that this court will probably
change every old rule brought under attack. In State v. Esser,20 it was
said: ". . that established common-law rules will be followed unless
after thorough consideration the court is convinced that new circum-
stances and needs of our society require a change.. .
1. Assumption of risk.
In McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.21 and Colson v.
Rule&2 the court abolished the defense of assumption of risk at least
where the assumption is implied from conduct. The court pointed out
that one's unreasonable exposure of himself to a particular hazard is
negligence, and subject to the comparative negligence statute. The court
adopted the principle in McConville that the driver of an automobile
owes his guest the same duty of ordinary care that he owes to others.
The court was, of course, making judgments as to the policy which
would be more consonant with justice. The new rule was presaged in
concurring opinions in Baird v. Cornelius."3 Two recent cases were
mentioned there as illustrations of injustice worked by the old rule.
In Schinke v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 4 passenger-wife
sought to recover damages from her husband for injuries caused by
driving at an excessive speed. The jury found that the wife assumed
the risk. She testified that she had protested against the speed, but the
court found justification for the jury's verdict in the fact that the jury
might have inferred that her "protests were not as vigorously made as
they might have been," could have decided that she should have left
the car when the husband made a stop 20 miles before they reached
home, or that she should have demanded that he let her out at some
other point before the accident.
Even if we guess that the same jury would have found that under
the circumstances the wife was negligent in continuing to ride with her
husband, it would have been improbable that it would have found her
negligence equal to or greater than his. We would be more assured that
20 Supra, footnote 14.
21 Supra, footnote 1.
22Supra, footnote 2.
232 Wis. 2d 284, 297, 303, 107 N.W. 2d 278 (1961).
2410 Wis. 2d 251, 103 N.W. 2d 73 (1960).
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justice had been done if the jury had been asked to find whether she
was negligent, and to compare her negligence with that of her husband.
In Severson v. Hauck,25 plaintiff, a 15-year old girl, was injured
when a passenger in a vehicle driven by a 19-year old friend, the de-
fendant. They and others had attended a party and had consumed some
beer. Plaintiff was in the back seat of the car with other girls, and they
were "fooling around, tickling, giggling, and jumping." Somehow plain-
tiff suffered a cut on the back of her head and was dazed. When this
was discovered one of the girls yelled to defendant to turn around and
look at plaintiff's head. He slowed the car, turned to look at plaintiff
for several seconds, and as a result ran into a bridge.
The jury found that plaintiff assumed the risk of excessive speed
and negligent management and control. They also found plaintiff caus-
ally negligent and attributed 25 per cent of all the causal negligence to
her. The court held that plaintiff's knowledge of the defendant's drink-
ing before she entered the car, and her failure to protest afterward
when she was aware of his speed and certain difficulty he had in con-
trolling the car before the accident were sufficient bases for the finding
of assumption of risk.
Plaintiff's conduct in the back seat may have been, as found by the
jury, negligence which caused the collision. In theory, other guests who
didn't participate in the horseplay to the same extent, may have had
a cause of action against plaintiff. The same jury might have found
plaintiff negligent in riding with defendant, and that such negligence
plus the negligent horseplay was equal to at least 50 per cent of all the
causal negligence. But, as in the Schinke Case,26 we would be more as-
sured that a just result had been reached if the jury had been permitted
to answer the appropriate questions in terms of negligence rather than
assumption of risk.
It was pointed out in the concurring opinion in Baird27 that the de-
fense of assumption of risk often produces an injustice to a third party
defendant. Where two or more drivers are involved, and the negligence
of one has been assumed by the guest, the whole burden of liability is
placed on the other, even though all may be equally at fault. In many
cases, including Baird, the host driver is more at fault.
The cases just mentioned are illustrations of the tendency of the
defense of assumption of risk to produce injustice in automobile host-
guest cases. As a generalization, the court said that the evaluation, policy
judgment and concepts underlying the defense of assumption of risk
"do not appear sufficiently valid under present-day customs and com-
munity attitude toward the use of automobiles."
25 11 Wis. 2d 192, 105 N.W. 2d 369, 106 N.W. 2d 404 (1960).
26 Supra, footnote 24.
27 Supra, footnote 23.
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Another field in which the defense of assumption of risk was caus-
ing difficulty was that of injuries to farm laborers. Where a farm em-
ploye was injured by farm machinery and claimed that his employer
was negligent, it might be claimed that his exposure of himself to danger
was assumption of risk or contributory negligence or both. The result
of establishing one defense might be quite different from the other, but
distinction between them was difficult and often seemed artificial.2 8
In Colson v. Rule, 9 the court abolished the defense of assumption
of risk in farm labor cases, at least where there has been no express
consent. Several policy reasons for this change were set forth: (1) It
is unrealistic to hold that a farm laborer has assumed the risk of a
dangerous situation arising from his use of a defective tool or piece of
equipment supplied by his employer. (2) The defense of assumption
of risk tends to immunize the employers who are the greatest trans-
gressors in providing safe conditions of work. (3) The difficult and
highly technical distinction mentioned above. (4) It is unjust to bar
recovery where the employe passively accepts an unsafe condition and
grant a partial recovery to an actively careless employee to whom a
jury attributes less than 50 per cent of the causal negligence.
Several questions have been raised as to the extent and meaning of
the McConville and Colson decisions. In a recent case, Huntley v. Don-
levy,3° argument was made suggesting that where plaintiff's voluntary
exposure of himself to a known hazard was sufficient to be deemed
assumption of risk, it was sufficient to constitute at least 50 per cent of
the causal negligence as a matter of law. A similar argument was made
in McConville. It is clear from both cases that the court does not con-
sider conduct upon which a finding of assumption of risk could be
grounded under the old rule as necessarily the equivalent of contributory
negligence equal to the negligence of the host. To hold otherwise would
allow the disfavored doctrine back into the law, through a rear entrance.
Another question raised is whether the defense has been abolished
in all instances of its former application. The McConville and Colson
Cases dealt with the relationship of host to guest in an automobile and
employer to employe on a farm. The policy questions germane to this
defense in other situations have not yet been re-examined by the court.
The opinions in McConville and Colson do not say that an express
agreement to assume a particular risk will not be a defense where in-
jury results from that risk. Whether and under what circumstances a
clear and specific assumption of a particular risk will still be treated
28 See Venden v. Meisel, 2 Wis. 2d 253, 85 N.W. 2d 766 (1957), Haile v. Ellis,
5 Wis. 2d 221, 92 N.W. 2d 863, 93 NAV. 2d 857 (1958), and cases referred to
therein.29 Supra, footnote 2.
30 16 Wis. 2d 412, 114 N.W. 2d 848 (1962).
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as a complete defense, rather than as contributory negligence if un-
reasonable, remains to be decided as the cases arise.
2. Contribution. In Bielski v. Schulze,31 the court modified the rule
of contribution between concurrent tort feasors which previously ap-
plied. It was said at page 6:
we conclude the amount of liability for contribution of tort-
feasors who sustain a common liability by reason of causal
negligence should be determined in proportion to the percentage
of causal negligence attributable to each....
As indicated in the opinion, the doctrine of contribution is equitable
in nature, and the rule will accomplish its equitable purpose more com-
pletely if the ultimate distribution of the burden is based on the propor-
tion of causal negligence of each tort feasor.
The argument that the new rule would complicate litigation was
accorded little weight because of the experience lawyers, courts and
juries have had in this state in comparing negligence. The adjustment
in special verdicts required by the new rule is that there must be a
comparison of the causal negligence of concurring tort feasors even
though plaintiff be found not negligent. Ordinarily no more than one
comparison question would be required. If, for example, plaintiff and
two defendants be each found causally negligent, and 20 per cent of
the total be attributed to plaintiff, 35 per cent to one defendant and 45
per cent to the second, plaintiff can recover 80 per cent of his damages
from either defendant or both. The first defendant's share of the burden
is 35/80 of plaintiff's recovery and the share of the second defendant is
45/80. If either defendant pays more than his share, he is entitled to
contribution for the difference.
It is doubtless too early to say whether the new rule will make settle-
ments more difficult. It certainly changes certain factors in appraising
the possible results of going to trial.
As indicated in the opinion of the court, releases can be drawn under
the new rule which sufficiently protect the settling tort-feasor from a
claim of contribution, if plaintiff agrees to satisfy such percentage of
the judgment he ultimately recovers, as the settling tort-feasor's causal
negligence is determined to be of all the causal negligence of all the co-
tort-feasors liable to plaintiff.
Bielski v. Schulze also abolished the concept of gross negligence.
Mr. Justice Hallows, writing for the court, pointed out changes which
had occurred from time to time in the history of this concept, and
stated that one of the main reasons for its growth was to ameliorate
the hardships of the common law doctrine of contributory neglience,
modified in 1931 by our comparative negligence statute. "The doctrine
31 Supra, footnote 3.
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of gross negligence as a vehicle of social policy no longer fulfills a pur-
pose in comparative negligence .... .32 Inequities resulting from the con-
cept of gross negligence in the field of contribution and indemnity were
pointed out, and reasons for retaining this concept were found to have
little merit.
The new rules announced in Bielski (decided March 6, 1962) were
applied retroactively except for three situations described as follows:
(1) Where a judgment based upon the old rules has been entered and no
motion to vacate it has been made or appeal taken before this date; (2)
where verdicts have been rendered sufficient to dispose of the case un-
der the former rules but where application of the new rules would re-
quire a new trial not required for other reasons; (3) when settlements
have been effected with one co-tort-feasor in such manner as would
sufficiently protect him from liability for contribution under the former
rules.
3. Negligence comparisons under McConville and Bielski. As previ-
ously suggested the Bielski rule on contribution will require no funda-
mental change in framing a special verdict, although in some cases where
no comparison between defendants would have been required before
Bielski such comparison will now be necessary. Under McConville,
however, it is recognized that a new problem may exist where a plaintiff
guest is allegedly negligent in riding with her host, there has been a
collision between two allegedly negligent drivers, and either driver
claims damages from the other.
Assume that plaintiff Guest has unreasonably exposed herself to
known hazards in riding with defendant Host. A collision was caused
by Host's negligence and negligence of defendant Other Driver. All
were injured. Before McConville, a finding that Guest assumed the risk
would ordinarily have disposed of her claim against Host, assuming that
Host's negligence was within the risk assumed, and the recovery of one
driver against the other would have been determined on the basis of the
comparison of their causal negligence, made by the jury.
After McConville, the jury will not be asked whether Guest assumed
the risk, but whether she was negligent and whether her negligence
caused her injuries. If the only issue as to Guest's negligence is whether
she was negligent in riding with Host, the problem is not difficult.
Assume 20 per cent of all the negligence causing her injuries is at-
tributed to her, 45 per cent to Host and 35 per cent to Other Driver.
Guest recovers 80 per cent of her damages from Host and Other Driver,
jointly and severally. But only 80 per cent of the found negligence
caused the collision and the injuries to Host and Other Driver. Should
not Other Driver be given judgment against Host for 45/80 of Other
32 Supra, footnote 3, p. 17.
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Driver's damages? He will be awarded contribution of any amount he
pays Guest in excess of 35/80 of her recovery.
A more difficult problem will arise if Guest is also accused of negli-
gent conduct which caused the collision, e.g. creating a disturbance in
the car, as plaintiff did in Severson v. Hauck.33 Guest's negligence in
riding with Host caused her injury, but did not cause the collision.
Guest's negligence in interfering with Host's lookout or management
helped cause the collision as well as her own injury.
This problem was discussed in McConville as follows:
Active negligence of a guest may be a cause of the collision
and consequently a cause of his injuries. In the instant case, for
instance, McConville's inadequate lookout, and presumably his
failure to warn Mrs. Licht, were found by the jury to be a cause
of the collision. A guest's negligence in riding with a host-driver
whose known habits or lack of skill present a hazard would not
be a cause of a collision, but would be a cause of the guest's injury
resulting from that hazard. Here the second driver, Mr. Peter-
son, has been eliminated from the case, and if McConville should
be found causally negligent as to lookout and as to riding with
Mrs. Licht, both types of negligence should be taken together
and compared with Mrs. Licht's causal negligence. If there were
still an issue with respect to negligence of a second driver caus-
ing the collision, and if there were claims of one driver against
the other for damages, it would be necessary to have more than
one comparison question. The guest's negligence with respect to
riding with the host would affect the guest's right to recover from
the host or the other driver or both, and would enter into the
comparison of the guest's causal negligence with that of each
driver but would be immaterial with respect to the right of one
driver to recover from the other.3" (Italics supplied)
This problem and the statement above quoted have caused consid-
erable discussion among trial lawyers and judges. There does not ap-
pear to be much question but that a guest may be guilty of conduct
which is so actively a cause of a collision that it would affect the rights
of others, but it has been earnestly urged that a guest's inattention and
failure to warn should be classified along with her negligence in riding
with the host, perhaps under the phrase "negligence with respect to her
own safety ;" that a guest has no duty to others to maintain a lookout
and to warn of danger; or that a failure in that respect is, as a matter
of policy, not a sufficient ground for liability of the guest; and that
in any event we have in past decisions recognized an unrealistic standard
of care with respect to lookout on the part of a guest in an automobile.
It is safe to assume that cases will arise in which the court will be
asked to modify or clarify the reference to guest's lack of lookout as
"active negligence" in the portion of McConville above quoted.
33 Svpra, footnote 25.
34 Supra, footnote 1, p. 385.
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It has also been suggested that it may not be necessary to include
more than one comparison question in a verdict, even where a guest's
"active" negligence be claimed. It has been suggested that a verdict
might be so framed as to call separate findings on a guest's negligence
with respect to riding with the host and her negligence in some other
respect, causing the collision, and to include but one comparison ques-
tion, which would nevertheless be a basis for a proper judgment.
Assume that in answer to the comparison question, the jury at-
tributes 10 per cent of all the negligence causing Guest's injuries to
Guest's negligence with respect to riding with Host, 15 per cent to
Guest's negligence with respect to interfering with Host's proper look-
out, 45 per cent to Host's negligence, and 30 per cent to Other Driver's
negligence. Guest will be given judgment for 75 per cent of her dam-
ages. Should not Other Driver have judgment against Host for 30/90
of his damages? The denominator 90 is the total of Guest's active
negligence (15) plus Host's negligence (45) plus Other Driver's negli-
gence (30). A single comparison question will reduce claims of incon-
sistency between answers. Won't the single comparison question, so
framed, be adequate in most cases, notwithstanding the reference in
McConville to "more than one comparison question?"
Answers to the questions just posed, and to the variations of them
which will arise as the circumstances vary, will necessarily await de-
cisions of the court in future cases.
4. Governmental immunity. In Holytz v. City of Milwaukee,35 the
doctrine of governmental immunity was abrogated. Several statements
in the opinion, written by Mr. Justice Gordon, significantly outline the
scope of the change.
The abrogation applies "broadly to torts, whether they be by com-
mission or omission."
Perhaps clarity will be afforded by our expression that hence-
forward, so far as governmental responsibility for torts is con-
cerned, the rule is liability-the exception is immunity. In deter-
mining the tort liability of a municipality it is no longer neces-
sary to divide its operations into those which are proprietary
and those which are governmental. Our decision does not broaden
the government's obligation so as to make it responsible for all
harms to others; it is only as to those harms which are torts that
governmental bodies are to be liable by reason of this decision.
Although the case at bar related specifically to a city, the court
stated that the
abrogation of the doctrine applies to all public bodies within the
state: the state, counties, cities, villages, towns, school districts,
sewer districts, drainage districts, and any other political sub-
divisions of the state--whether they be incorporated or not. By
a .-Supra, footnote 6.
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reason of the rule of respondeat superior a public body shall be
liable for damages for the torts of its officers, agents and em-
ployees occurring in the course of the business of such public
body.
This decision is not to be interpreted as imposing liability on
a governmental body in the exercise of its legislative or judicial
or quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions.
With respect to liability of the state, the court said:
Henceforward, there will be substantive liability on the part
of the state, but the right to sue the state is subject to sec. 27,
Art. IV of the Wisconsin Constitution which provides: "The
legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts
suits may be brought against the state." The decision in the case
at bar removes the state's defense of nonliability for torts, but it
has no effect upon the state's sovereign right under the Constitu-
tion to be sued only upon its consent.
The court noted that sec. 285.01, Stats., authorizing commencement
of suit against the state has been construed to apply only to those claims
which render the state a debtor, but stated that no opinion was expressed
upon the effect of the abolition of tort immunity upon the construction
of this section.
The court applied the new rule to the case before it, but postponed
its effect in all other cases until July 15, 1962, noting that public bodies
might need to make financial arrangements to meet new liabilities.
A list of municipal functions out of which new types of claims might
be expected to arise is set forth in Municipal Immunity From Tort
Claims Abolished.36 It should be noted, however, that governmental
bodies already were liable in many areas. Sec. 345.05, Stats., imposed
liability for damages caused by the negligent operation of a motor ve-
hicle owned and operated by governmental bodies. In other tort areas,
liability was imposed upon municipalities for damages incurred while
engaging in proprietary rather than governmental functions." There
was also liability for nuisance, where the relationship of governor-
governed did not exist.38 Governmental bodies were also liable for all
damages awarded against public officers, who caused damage in their
official capacity, while acting in good faith.3 9 There was also limited
liability for highway defects40 and liability for violation of the safe-
place statute. The impact of the abolition of governmental immunity
can be softened if governmental bodies procure liability insurance, as
they are authorized to do.41
36 THE MUNICIPAITY, Vol. 57, July 1962, No. 7, p. 171.
37 Christian v. New London, 234 Wis. 123, 290 N.W. 621 (1940) ; Highway Trailer
Co. v. Janesville Elec. Co., 187 Wis. 161, 204 N.W. 773 (1925).
38 See Comment, 45 MARQUErrE LAW REVIEW 90 (1961).
39 Sec. 270.58, STATS.
40 Sec. 81.15, STATs.
41 Sec. 66.18, STATs.
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The court recognized that the legislature is free to determine public
policy with respect to governmental immunity. It was said:
If the legislature deems it better public policy, it is, of course,
free to reinstate immunity. The legislature may also impose ceil-
ings on the amount of damages or set up administrative require-
ments which may be preliminary to the commencement of judicial
proceedings for an alleged tort. See, for example, the notice
provisions and the limitation of the amount of damages, in sec.
81.15, Stats.
In this connection it is interesting to compare the liability for torts
of a Wisconsin governmental body beginning July 15, 1962, with the
liability of the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The effect of the Holytz Case is similar in some instances and dis-
similar in others to recoveries under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The
United States is liable in the same manner as a private individual, except
there is no liability for interest prior to judgment or for punitive dam-
ages.4 2 The Tort Claims Act excepts among other things acts or omis-
sions in the execution of a statute or regulation, or damages caused in the
performance of a discretionary duty.
43
The federal act is dissimilar in that a judgment against the United
States is a bar to an action by the claimant against the employe." The
federal act provides an exclusive remedy where damages are caused by
the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an employe. 42 If an action
is brought against an employe for acts colorably within the scope of his
employ, the case is deemed one against the United States.46 Attorneys'
fees in suits against the United States are limited to 20 per cent of the
recovery.47 No recovery may be had for certain listed intentional torts."'
In Wisconsin the only limitation on such recovery for intentional torts
would be those inherent in the doctrine of respondeat superior.
5. Prospective overruling, or "sunbursting." Traditionally, when a
court overruled a previous decision, it was the theory that the older
decision had never been a correct statement of the law, and constituted
only an error made in the particular case. The new pronouncement was,
accordingly, completely retroactive, except to the extent that a principle
such as res judicata or a statute of limitation might prevent application
to a particular situation.
Obvious difficulties arise from completely retroactive application of
a changed rule. A court may become convinced that a particular rule is
wrong in principle although widely relied on in the conduct of business
4228 U.S.C. sec. 2674.
43 28 U.S.C. sec. 280.
44 28 U.S.C. sec. 2676.
45 28 U.S.C. sec. 2679.
46 28 U.S.C. sec. 2679.
-1 28 U.S.C. sec. 2678.
48 28 U.S.C. sec. 2680.
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or other affairs. If so, a change in the rule with prospective effect only
will be desirable. A rule may have served well under conditions at an
earlier time, but be discarded because it is out of tune with present day
customs and relationships.
In several of the recent cases where rules of tort law have been
changed, the changed rule is to be given prospective effect only, except
for the case at hand, or some other limited class of cases. This technique
is sometimes dubbed "sunbursting." The name comes from Great North-
ern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil Co.49 where the supreme court of the
United States held that a state court violated no federal rights by apply-
ing the doctrine announced in an earlier case to the litigant before it,
although deciding that the earlier doctrine was erroneous and would not
be followed in the future. Mr. Justice Cardozo, writing for the court,
said:
We think the federal constitution has no voice upon the sub-
ject; A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may
make a choice for itself between the principle of forward opera-
tion and that of relation backward. It may say that decisions of
its highest court, though later overruled, are law none the less
for intermediate transactions. Indeed there are cases intimating,
too broadly ... that it must give them that effect; but never has
doubt been expressed that it may so treat them if it pleases,
whenever injustice or hardship will thereby be averted.... On
the other hand, it may hold to the ancient dogma that the law de-
clared by its courts had a Platonic or ideal existence before the
act of declaration, in which event the discredited declaration
will be viewed as if it had never been, and the reconsidered
declaration as law from the beginning. . . . The alternative is
the same whether the subject of the new decision is common
law ... or statute.... The choice for any state may be deter-
mined by the juristic philosophy of the judges of her courts, their
conceptions of law, its origin and nature. We review not the
wisdom of their philosophies, but the legality of their acts. The
State of Montana has told us by the voice of her highest court
that with these alternative methods open to her, her preference
is for the first. In making this choice, she is declaring common
law for those within her borders. The common law as admin-
istered by her judges ascribes to the decisions of her highest
court a power to bind and loose that is unextinguished, for inter-
mediate transactions, by a decision overruling them. As applied
to such transactions we may say of the earlier decision that it
has not been overruled at all. It has been translated into a judg-
ment of affirmance and recognized as law anew. Accompanying
the recognition is a prophecy, which may or may not be realized
in conduct, that transactions arising in the future will be gov-
erned by a different rule. If this is the common law doctrine of
adherence to precedent as understood and enforced by the courts
of Montana, we are not at liberty, for anything contained in
49 287 U.S. 358, 53 S. Ct. 145, 77 L. Ed. 360 (1932).
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the constitution of the United States, to thrust upon those courts
a different conception either of the binding force of precedent
or of the meaning of the judicial process. (pp. 364-366)50
In M1/IcConville5 ' and Colson,5 2 abrogating the defense of assumption
of risk, the court did not limit the application of the change in law. The
existence of the defense becomes important to most people only in
retrospect. A prospective host probably does not consciously rely upon
it, either in offering an automobile ride to his guest or deciding whether
or not to carry liability insurance. The degree to which the existence of
the defense might affect the premiums charged by insurance companies
is not clear. Nor is it clear that a farmer would rely on the doctrine in
deciding against insurance. In any event, the concurring opinions in
Baird v. Cornelius,53 decided one year before McConville, had very
clearly signalled the probability that the defense was likely to be abro-
gated.
In Bielski 4 the court limited the retrospective application of the
change in law with respect to contribution and gross negligence. Here
again were elements of law which are ordinarily not relied upon by
people who are about to engage in tortious conduct. Yet the court was
mindful of the fact that if full retrospective application were given,
burdens of further litigation would probably be imposed on litigants
and the public in cases where claims had been substantially disposed of
by litigation or settlement. Such burdens would seem to be wasteful.
The limitations on retrospective application of the new rule of law with
respect to contribution and gross negligence have already been stated.
In Kojis5 5 abrogating certain charitable immunity, and in Holytz 5
abrogating governmental immunity, the change was applied prospec-
tively only, except for the case at bar. Hospitals may well have relied
upon the old rule of immunity in deciding not to insure against some
types of liability. Municipalities might well have concluded that they
were not authorized to insure against liability from which they were
considered immune. In Holytz, the court delayed the applicable date for
the new rule for more than a month after announcing the decision.
In each case where the change in law was not made retroactive, an
exception was made of the case before the court. As indicated in Kofis,
the principal reason for the exception is that the litigant who has at-
tacked the old rule should be entitled to the benefit of its demise. It is
50 See Kojis v. Doctors Hospital, supra, footnote 4, p. 373, supplemental opinion,
for citation of authorities discussing limitation of changed doctrine to pro-
spective application.51 Supra, footnote 1.
52 Supra, footnote 2.
53 Supra, footnote 23.
5'" Supra, footnote 3.
55 Supra, footnote 4.
56 Supra, footnote 6.
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a reward to him for his effort and expense in convincing the court that
the old rule is erroneous, and the opposite rule would deprive appellants
of incentive to challenge other precedent if deemed erroneous.
CONCLUSION
The most significant recent changes in tort law in Wisconsin have
been abrogation of certain defenses which are no longer thought to serve
good public policy. Claims which formerly were cut off when one of
these defenses was made to appear, will now be adjudicated upon jury
verdicts determining negligence, causal relationships of negligence to
injuries, and comparison of negligence. The court has been willing in
these instances to re-examine doctrines operating as absolute so that
responsibility for injuries and damage can be determined case by case
upon examination of all the circumstances.
